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COMMENT
The Regulation of Foreign Business in Mexico:
Recent Legislation in Historical Perspective
I. Introduction
Any foreigner who attempts to do business in Mexico will immedi-
ately encounter a legal system which treats the outsider as both a partner
and an adversary. The foreigner will find that Mexican legislation limits
the avenues of investment which are open to outsiders,1 constrains the
sale of technology or the operation of franchising agreements, 2 and pro-
hibits foreign investment in specified industries. 3 To some foreign ob-
servers, these restrictions on doing business in Mexico seem to be nothing
more than an expression of irrational nationalism; moreover, critics have
argued that the laws of Mexico are actually detrimental to the country's
self interest.4 To understand how such legislation was born and to ap-
preciate the flexibility with which it is administered, one must place
these laws in an historical context. In addition, one should analyze the
political pressures which affect their execution. Foreign business interests
can operate profitably in Mexico; however, they must operate so as to
benefit the development of the Mexican nation.5
For three centuries, from the time that Cortes landed in 1519 until
the independence wars of the nineteenth century, the Spanish main-
tained a mercantile empire by monopolizing trade relations with their
Mexican colony and extracting silver from its soils. Spanish policy was
intended to benefit the European monarch, without regard to the devel-
I See Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera (Law
on the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment), Diario
Oficial [D.O.] (Official Daily of Mexico) (Mar. 9, 1973), reprinted in 12 Int'l Legal Materials
643 (1973) (English translation) [hereinafter cited as Investmenl Law].
[Editor's note: Diario Oficiil, which publishes the official texts of such materials as the
Constitution, laws and regulations of Mexico, will be citd as D.O. throughout the remainder of
this article.)
2 See Ley Sobre el Registro de la Transferencia de Technologia y el Uso y Explotaci6n de
Patentes y Marcas (Law on the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents
and Trademarks), D.O. (Dec. 30, 1972), reprinted in 12 Int'l Legal Materials 421 (1973) (Eng-
lish Translation) [hereinafter cited as Technology Transfer Law].
3 See Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
4 See generally Lacey, Technology and Industrial Property Licensing in Latin America:
A Legislative Revolution, 6 Int'l Law. 388, 403-05 (1972), for a discussion of Mexico's approach
to the regulation of the payment of royalties and technical fees.
5 See, e.g., id. at 405.
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opment of Mexico. 6 The independence movement of the nineteenth cen-
tury freed Mexico from European rule; yet, Mexico even now has failed
to overcome its heritage of colonialism.
7
Mexican efforts to develop their nation during the early years of this
century exacerbated the country's dependence upon foreigners. Before
the Revolution of 1910, foreign interests controlled the most productive
industries in the country and owned huge areas of the national territory.8
When the Great Depression ravaged the Mexican economy, the local au-
thorities began to assert a nationalistic aversion to foreign enterprises. In
1938, the movement to achieve economic independence culminated in
the expropriation of the assets of foreign oil companies operating in
Mexico.9
In the past ten years, social scientists throughout Latin America
have led the call for a new international economic order, arguing that
third world countries should overcome their dependency on the devel-
oped world.' 0 The political program of the "dependency theorists" is
clearcut-pace the industrialization cf Latin America so that domestic
needs are served first, reshape the terms of trade for commodity exports
by forming producer organizations, and force foreign investors to share
more of their profits and their technologies with their hosts through do-
mestic legislation. Although virtually all of the Latin American nations
have enacted some sort of legislation intended to control foreign capital,
Mexico has been especially thorough and vehement in its attempts to
eliminate foreign influence in its domestic economy and to restructure its
trade relations with the developed nations.
The Mexican legislature has codified a series of ad hoc administra-
tive procedures which developed out of efforts to achieve economic inde-
pendence. These laws have explicit purposes. The Law on the Transfer
of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks
(1972)11 is an effort to limit the types of technology being purchased by
Mexican buyers and thereby eliminate the acquisition of obsolete tech-
nologies and the payment of unnecessary royalties. The Law to Promote
6 D. Cosio Villegas, I. Bernal, A. Toscano, L. Gonziles & E. Blanquel, A Compact His-
tory of Mexico 60-62 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as D. Cosio Villegas].
7 Many Latin American economies continue to be oriented toward production for foreign
markets rather than for domestic consumption. See generally S. Stein & B. Stein, The Colonial
Heritage of Latin America (1970), for insights into Latin American economic history from 1500
to 1900.
8 See F. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico 37-42 (1964); J. Bazant, A Con-
cise History of Mexico 108-16 (1977).
9 Other countries in Latin America took similar actions in the following decades, culmi-
nating with the takeover of all foreign property in Cuba during the Castro regime. For an
account of the Mexican oil expropriation, see P. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America 55-
73 (1980).
10 Some of the better known works of dependency theory include: Furtado, Economic
Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution
(1970); 0. Sunkel, El Subdesarrollo y la Teoria del Desarrollo (1971); F. Cardoso & E. Faletto,
Dependencia & Desarrolo en America Latina (1969).
i1 Technology Transfer Law, supra note 2.
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Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment (1973)12 is an at-
tempt to reduce foreign domination of the capital markets in Mexico and
to promote the "Mexicanization" of existing industries. Finally, the Law
of Inventions and Trademarks (1976)13 is intended to encourage the use
of Mexican trademarks by those companies manufacturing in Mexico.
The government's goal in all of these measures is to assure the maximum
possible reward for Mexico in all dealings with foreigners.
Despite these new laws, U.S. trade with Mexico is booming. The
United States now supplies two-thirds of Mexico's imports1 4 and U.S.
investors account for three-fourths of all the direct foreign investment in
the country.1 5 Mexico has been able to gain foreign exchange easily
from the sale of oil, and her international credit rating has soared.' 6
During 1979, Mexico received the third largest loan on record ($2.5 bil-
lion) from a consortium of sixty-six worldwide banks, marking the first
time in history that the country has been able to get access to interna-
tional money markets on favorable terms."7
Because Mexico is a major market for the United States, it is of
crucial importance that lawyers who deal with Mexican trade legislation
have an understanding of why Mexico has passed laws that limit foreign
access to its markets. Moreover, the administration of Mexican trade
legislation has an obvious effect on the terms of trade for any U.S. firm
doing business with the Mexicans.
The first section of this comment will provide some basic informa-
tion on the economic development of Mexico and the historical back-
ground for the current laws regarding foreign enterprises. It will
conclude with an analysis of Mexican trade policy and with an overview
of the current opportunities for trade with Mexico. The second section
will discuss the recent law on foreign investment and trade, focusing on
how those laws have been administered and how they will affect foreign
businesses. The conclusion will highlight the importance of an historical
perspective in understanding Mexico's revolutionary legislation.
II. Economic Development in Mexico-The Revolution
Past and Present
Mexico is a land of extreme economic and social contrasts. Accord-
ing to most standards of economic development, Mexico should be con-
12 Investment Law, supra note 1.
13 Ley de Invenciones y Marcas (Law of Inventions and Trademarks), D.O. (Feb. 10,
1976), selected provisions reprinted in 2 Offner's Int'l Trademark Serv. 1592 (2d ed. Fieldston)
(English translation) [hereinafter cited as Trademark Law].
14 Economic Growth Likely to Slow to 5 Percent in 1982; Policies of New President May
Affect Economy, Market, Bus. Am. 22, 23 (Jan. 11, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Economic
Growth].
15 Discovering Mexico Again, Bus. Week 70, 72 (Oct. 1, 1979).
16 Street, Mexico's Economic Development Plan, 80 Current Hist. 374, 374 (1981).
17 Frontier of the 80s-Mexico, Bus. Week 23, 27 (Nov. 5, 1979) (special advertising
section).
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sidered a successfully developed nation: sixty-four percent of the
population lives in urban areas,1 8 eighty-four percent of the people are
literate, 19 and per capita income in 1980 was approximately $2,100.20
Furthermore, since 1938, the gross national product has grown at an an-
nual rate of not less than five percent (discounted for inflation),2' and the
growth rate for 1980 was 8.3%.22 In addition to these social and eco-
nomic achievements, Mexico has shown great political stability. Al-
though Latin America has a tradition of violent politics, Mexico has had
an orderly transition of government since 1920 without experiencing any
intervention by the armed forces. 23 Such a record should place Mexico
in the vanguard of developing nations.
Nevertheless, Mexico has failed to distribute the benefits of eco-
nomic development to many of its citizens. The rural poor still live in
extreme misery, without access to sanitary water, adequate housing,
medical care, electricity, or nutritious food. 24 Those who flee the coun-
tryside often end up in urban slums. Thirty-two percent of the families
in Mexico in 1977 received only the minimum income necessary to
purchase their economic necessities, and fourteen and a half percent re-
ceived less than the minimum.2 5 Moreover, the disparity between the
rich and the poor has worsened in the past twenty years. In 1958 the
richest five percent of Mexican families had an aggregate income twenty-
two times as great as the poorest ten percent; in 1977 the richest five
percent had twenty-five times as much income as the poorest ten
percent.2 6
The economic situation of the poor will not be improved easily. Es-
timates of the number of underemployed run as high as forty percent or
more of the work force,27 and the country has one of the fastest growing
populations in the world. Currently at 70 million, the population is ex-
pected to reach 100 million by the year 2000 if a 1972 governmental
program of family planning results in a declining rate of population
growth.2 8 The overcrowded capital, Mexico City, already houses thirty-
five percent of the republic's industry and seventy percent of its serv-
18 Gonzilez Casanova, The Economic Development of Mexico, Sci. Am., Sept. 1980, at
192, 195.
19 Id. at 202.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 192.
22 Economic Growth, supra note 14, at 23.
23 See D. Cosio Villegas, supra note 6, at 143-45.
24 The author worked in a rural community in Glascala where these problems existed.
For sociological statistics, see Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 18, at 202.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 M. Olizar, Guide to the Mexican Markets 1976-77, at 35 (9th ed. 1976). Underem-
ployed persons are those persons who are working but are unable to support themselves.
28 Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 18, at 194. If the historical rate of population growth
continues, however, Mexico will have more than 132 million inhabitants in the year 2000. Id.
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ices.29 Clearly, a large proportion of the Mexican people have not shared
in the bounty of economic development. Huge areas of the country re-
main in an economically undeveloped and depressed condition. 30
Why has Mexico developed in such an uneven fashion? The answer
to that question is necessarily complex; the pre-Conquest social structure,
the Spanish colonial influence, and the expansion of the world economy
have all influenced Mexico's history. Many Mexicans blame their mala-
dies on a single source: the avaricious foreigner. Foreigners have in-
vaded Mexico militarily, and they have profited from the natural
resources of the country through their business ventures. During the
nineteenth century Mexico struggled through foreign invasions by both
France and the United States, and lost one-third of its national territory
to its northern neighbor.3i Additionally, from 1876 until 1910, the coun-
try was opened officially to foreign investors because the leadership of
Mexico believed that external capital and foreign technological expertise
was crucial to the improvement of the country. 32 During this era, the
dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, Mexico was crisscrossed by railroads and
telegraph lines. Oil, textile, and steel industries were initiated, and sugar
production boomed. Foreigners controlled the assets and reaped the
profits from these activities. By 1910, one-seventh of the nation's land
and one-half of her total assets were in foreign hands.33 One percent of
the country's inhabitants (foreigners and local landlords) owned ninety-
seven percent of the land, while ninety-six percent of the population held
two percent of the land.34
The result of this maldistribution of wealth was the world's first
twentieth century revolution. 35 Rival factions, led by Pancho Villa,
Emiliano Zapata, and Venustiano Carranza, struggled for power in a
violent chaos which led to the death of one in every ten Mexicans. 36 The
eventual victors were the Constitutionalists led by Carranza. They ral-
lied around the Constitution of 1917 37-a document drawn up by a
group of radical intellectuals and approved by a constituent assembly of
29 Centro de Estudios del Sector Privido, Analysis de la Potencialidad Economica del Area
Metropolitana xiii (1970).
30 For an analysis of the government's attempts to remedy this situation, seeJ. Wilkie, The
Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910 (2d. rev. ed. 1970).
31 For an excellent account of U.S.-Mexican relations, see H. Cline, The United States
and Mexico (1969).
32 See C. Reynolds, The Mexican Economy 200 (1970); J. Herget & J. Camil, An Intro-
duction to the Mexican Legal System 13 (1978).
33 Comment, "Pobre Mexico, Tan Lejos de Dios y Tan Cerca de Los Estados Unidos"-
Mexican Foreign Investment Regulation, 2 L. & Soc. Order 280, 282 (1972).
34 Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 18, at 195.
35 Revolution in Mexico: Years of Upheaval, 1910-1940, at 3 (J. Wilkie & A. Michaels ed.
1969).
36 See C. Cumberland, Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity 235-45 (1968); J. Wilkie,
supra note 30, at 24.
37 Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mex.), reprinted in 10 Consti-
tutions of the Countries of the World (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1982) (1977 O.A.S. transla-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Constitution].
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Carranza supporters. 38 This Constitution remains the supreme law of
the land in Mexico.
However, there are ironies in the Revolution's success. The Revolu-
tion did not quash foreign influence in the country; instead, foreigners
increased their control over the export industries of Mexico (agriculture,
mining, and oil), while small, local businesses languished. 39 Moreover,
land reform, which had been the rallying call of the Zapatista faction
and the foremost goal of the revolutionary program, was barely at-
tempted until 1934.40
The Revolution did have a major impact on the course of Mexican
history. One long-lasting result of the Revolution has been the ideologi-
cal commitment of the Mexican government to social change. The Con-
stitution of 1917 is a truly radical document. Among its features are
declarations of the government's right to control subsoil property in
Mexico and the workers' right to organize. 4' The Constitution also es-
tablishes a republican form of government led by a President who serves
a six-year term and cannot succeed himself. The Mexican Chief Execu-
tive has rather extraordinary powers-he can propose changes in the
laws and veto legislation; he can create law by official decree; he has vast
powers of appointment; and he can control budgetary and commercial
decisions. 42
For the past fifty-three years the President has come from a single
political party, the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI). This
party dominates all elections in Mexico. PRI is an incorporative organi-
zation, granting concessions to the opposition from the left and the right
in order to represent all sectors of society. 43 PRI maintains a monopoly
position in Mexican politics through a sophisticated manipulation of the
political symbols and rhetoric of the Revolution, a selective use of repres-
sion, and a system of political compromises. 44
The leaders of PRI have attempted to foster economic development
by relying on the economic elite in the private sector; at the same time,
however, they have maintained a commitment to social justice.45 The
result of this development policy has been a mixed economy in which
both private and public sectors participate. The government has inter-
vened in the marketplace whenever it has chosen to guide the nation
toward social equity by manipulating the economy. Government inter-
38 See C. Cumberland, supra note 36, at 262-69.
39 See C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 203.
40 See J. Wilkie, supra note 30, at 76, for a summary of land redistribution during the
presidency of Cirdenas, 1934-1940.
41 Constitution, supra note 37, art. 27 (amended 1960, 1975) (subsoil); id. art. 123, § XVI
(right to organize).
42 See Comment, supra note 33, at 289-90; C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 203.
43 Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 18, at 192.
44 Id.
45 See generally R. Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development (1963).
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vention has been most noticeable in the regulation of foreign businesses
operating in Mexico.
The present laws regarding foreign enterprises in Mexico have de-
veloped over the past fifty years. Before 1930, the Mexican government
treated private capital-both foreign and domestic-with deference.
Mexican presidents wished to avoid both the wrath of the United States
government 46 and the possibility of a clash with social elites. 47 Trade
policy was not coordinated with the desire for economic development; it
consisted of a system of ineffective tariffs designed to protect local indus-
tries and produce federal revenues. 48 However, under the regime of Pres-
ident Lizaro Cirdenas (1934-1940), the government began to forge a
cohesive program of economic development. Massive social programs
were initiated. Land was finally distributed to the people who actually
farmed it.4 9 A government development bank, the National Financiera,
was founded to finance vital industries which private developers refused
to fund. 50 The most memorable action of the CGrdenas administration
was the expropriation of foreign oil holdings on March 18, 1938, a day
still celebrated in Mexico as the beginning of economic independence. 51
When the British and American-owned oil companies refused to negoti-
ate with Mexican workers regarding their demands for more input into
management decisions and greater salaries, the government seized the oil
wells. 52 After the oil takeover, the government created a monopoly oil
company owned by the state (PEMEX) to pump, process, and distribute
petroleum. 53
The creation of a state-owned oil company is indicative of the type
of action the Mexican government has taken in order to protect vital
industries from foreign domination. The policy of PRI has been to sup-
port government intervention in the domestic private sector when that
intervention is socially necessary. From the CArdenas administration un-
til the present, public sector investment has represented at least forty per-
cent of total investment, except for 1955-1961, when it was thirty
percent. 54
On the other hand, PRI has not attempted to eradicate the private
46 See C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 203-04.
47 See Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 18, at 200.
48 Nacional Financiera, La Politica Industrial, in I La Economia Mexicana: Anilisis por
Sectores y Distribucion 194-96 (L. Solis ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Nacional Financiera].
49 J. Wilkie, supra note 30, at 76.
50 Bus. Int'l Corp., Organizing for Latin American Operations (1962) (Research Report
No. 20).
51 Id. at 9.
52 See P. Sigmund, supra note 9, at 56-57.
53 See Latin American Division, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, "Twenty Questions"-A "Mex-
ico Workshop" Handout Covering Issues Most Frequently Raised by New-to-the-Market Sup-
pliers 8 (1980) (describing registration procedures for foreign suppliers desiring to do business
with Mexican governmental agencies) (copy available in office of N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.)
[hereinafter cited as Twenty Questions].
54 See Gonzalez Casanova, supra note 18, at 196.
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sector within the country, nor have they attempted to ban foreign invest-
ment. Rather they have sought to control the use of capital so that it
benefits public policy. A cornerstone of that policy has been to change
Mexico from an agricultural society into an industrial nation. Through
a rather unorthodox trade policy the government has implemented a
successful program of import substitution. In other words, the govern-
ment has established a nucleus of industries producing non-durable con-
sumer goods in order to substitute local products for imported foreign
products. 55 The novelty of the Mexican plan for import substitution was
that it created protectionist barriers to importation of goods while rely-
ing on the importation of foreign capital and manufacturing skills as a
key to industrialization. 56 The PRI leadership has attempted to lure the
capital and technology of foreigners without relinquishing control of the
economy to outsiders. This model of industrialization via import substi-
tution has had a significant impact on laws regarding foreign enterprises
in Mexico.
When the government of Mexico embarked on the import substitu-
tion policy it found itself in a dilemma. The government needed a legal
system which would guarantee foreign investment while, at the same
time, controlling it. The militant actions of the Cirdenas administration
in the late 1930's scared foreign investors away from the country, while
the depression simultaneously reduced Mexico's export earnings. With
neither private nor public funds available for the stimulation of industry,
Mexico was left with a stagnating economy. 5
7
The succeeding administration of Avila Camacho and the advent of
World War II brought a tremendous reversal in Mexican industrializa-
tion. By negotiating a settlement with the expropriated oil firms, the
new president reassured skeptical foreign investors. When World War II
disrupted production abroad and cut off imports, the stage was set for a
new flood of foreign capital to establish manufacturing industries in the
country.58 Local production of goods skyrocketed. Thus, between 1940
and 1950 Mexico experienced a huge influx of foreign money and
technology. 59
Because of their revolutionary heritage, government officials were
already aware of the need to control foreign ownership of assets within
the nation. Therefore, they made tentative moves to guarantee that in-
dustrialization would serve Mexican needs. On June 29, 1944, President
Avila Camacho issued a decree which authorized the executive branch to
limit foreign ownership of Mexican corporations to forty-nine percent of
55 See generally C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 215-30; see R. Vernon, supra note 45, at
182.
56 See C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 251-54, for a discussion of Mexico's program of
import substitution.
57 Id. at 208-09.
58 See Comment, supra note 33, at 292.
59 See C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 239.
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the investment capital. 60 Although not immediately enforced, this law
did establish a precedent for the "Mexicanization" of import substitution
industries. Later, legislation was passed to enable the Mexican President
to establish tariff rates, control imports, and regulate foreign trade. 6'
The Mexican government thus assumed effective control over foreign in-
fluence in the economy.
After 1940, the trade policy of Mexico was selectively protectionist.
During this period the government has used two main weapons to pro-
tect the domestic economy: import licensing and tariffs. Import licens-
ing was a regulatory scheme first introduced in 1940, but not widely used
until 1947.62 To get a license or permit to bring goods into the country,
the importer had to show that the imported products could not be pro-
duced in Mexico. The price of producing goods domestically was not a
factor in licensing decisions until 1966.63 This scheme of import restric-
tion has been a basic feature of Mexican commercial policy from 1954
until the present. 64 In 1981, eighty-three percent of the total value of
goods coming into Mexico entered under a license from the govern-
ment.65 The effect of this import licensing system is to establish quotas
on the sale of goods to Mexican consumers from foreign sources.
Tariffs are the second means used to protect domestic industry. The
government levied tariffs in order to make imported goods less appealing
to the Mexican consumer. From 1930 until 1950 tariff levels remained
low compared to those in other Latin American nations. An exception
was luxury goods which met a duty of 100 percent. 66 This sort of tariff
policy was unusual for a country undergoing import substitution because
such nations usually erect high tariff barriers against nearly all imports.
A further anomaly in Mexican protectionism was the fact that the
government put no controls on foreign exchange or the repatriation of
profits. Both these policies had the effect of maintaining a free flow of
trade with the United States, a flow which was furthered by the bilateral
reduction of tariffs in 1942.67 Mexican commercial policies pleased for-
eign entrepreneurs, especially U.S. firms, and had the effect of encourag-
ing foreigners to underwrite the creation of manufacturing enterprises in
Mexico.6 8
Two other PRI policies aided the drive for import substitution.
First, the government maintained the stability of the peso against the
60 See Comment, supra note 33, at 294.
61 See Ley Reglamentaria del Parafo Segundo del Articulo 131 de la Constituci6n Politica
de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos (Regulations for the Second Paragraph of Article 131 of the
Mexican Constitution), D.O. (Jan. 5, 1981).
62 H. Wright, Foreign Enterprise in Mexico 168 (1971).
63 Id. at 169.
64 See C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 209; see also Economic Growth, supra note 13, at 23.
65 Economic Growth, supra note 13, at 23.
66 See H. Wright, supra note 62, at 167; C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 168.
67 See generally C. Reynolds, supra note 32, at 220-30.
68 Id.
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dollar for twenty-two years, 1954-1976, thus relieving investors' concerns
about the devaluation of their earnings. 69 Second, the government
granted huge tax subsidies to manufacturers, almost indiscriminately
before 1950,70 and later with more discretion, in a conscious effort to aid
development under the 1954 Law for the Development of New and Nec-
essary Industries. 7 1 Warmed by these added benefits, foreign corpora-
tions returned to the Mexican market.
By the early 1960's, Mexico's leading economists began to argue
that the country was entering a new developmental phase and that new
consumer commercial policies were needed. 72 Light industries in Mexico
were producing successfully because imports of consumer goods had di-
minished drastically; but Mexico's trade deficit was increasing as exports
had declined also. 73 The inefficiency of local industries, that were devel-
oped in a hothouse atmosphere of protectionism, resulted in products
which were non-competitive on international markets.74
Economic critics offered a series of suggestions to deal with the new
developmental phase. They argued that Mexico's protectionist controls
should be lifted, the export of manufactured goods should be promoted,
industry in Mexico should be decentralized, and the government should
create more public sector corporations in low-profit, socially necessary
industries. 75
The government took steps during the 1960's to respond in each of
these areas. First, it relaxed import licensing requirements to force more
efficient management of domestic industries. The Mexican state also
granted open-ended import licenses to allow an importer to bring in
goods under a series of transactions rather than seeking a license for each
transaction. The authorities reduced the waiting period for a license in
some cases by making an expedited license possible. 76 They began to
grant tax subsidies to businesses which would move into underdeveloped
areas. 7 7 Furthermore, the federal government bankrolled and then oper-
ated a number of vital industries as state agencies: a food processing and
distribution corporation (CONASUPO),78 a national producer of ferti-
lizer (FERTIMEX), a Mexican electric utility (CFE), and a steel and
69 See Gonzflez Casanova, supra note 18, at 204.
70 H. Wright, supra note 62, at 181.
71 Ley Para el Fomento de las Industrias Nuevas y Necesarias (Law for the Development
of New and Necessary Industries), D.O. (Dec. 31, 1954).
72 Balassa, La Industrializaci6n y El Comercio Exterior: AnfUisis y Proposiciones, in La
Sociedad Mexicana: Presente y Futuro 33 (M. Wionczek ed. 2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Balassa].
73 See R. Vernon, supra note 45, at 180, 182.
74 See C. Reynolds, supra note 32, 213-15.
75 Balassa, supra note 72, at 34; Bueno, Las Perspectivas de la Politica de Desarrollo In-
dustrial en Mexico, 17 Comercio Exterior 891 (1967).
76 H. Wright, supra note 62, at 169.
77 Bus. Int'l Corp., supra note 50, at 11.
78 Nacional Financiera, supra note 48, at 196.
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iron manufacturer (SIDERMEX).79 The laws regarding tax subsidies
were tightened so that only the most worthwhile industries benefitted.8 0
And finally the government began to promote the "Mexicanization" of
industry by encouraging foreigners to share their investment risk with
the private sector in Mexico. The Secretariat of Industry and Commerce
promoted "Mexicanization" by offering special treatment to those enter-
prises with a majority of Mexican capital,"' while the Secretariat of For-
eign Relations began to demand the "Mexicanization" of new
investment in important categories of industry-air transport, shipping,
rubber manufacture, mining, broadcasting, fishing, and soft drink
sales.8
2
The paradox of industrialization for a developing nation is that pro-
gress in creating new domestic industries increases the country's depen-
dence upon foreign trade. A nation like Mexico cannot rely upon its
fledgling domestic market to pay for the costs of industrialization, espe-
cially after consumer goods industries have been established, leaving the
domestic production of heavy machinery as the next goal. Thus, devel-
oping countries must either sell more abroad or borrow extensively in
order to finance continued development.
8 3
In Mexico, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the
government has been committed to social change since 1910. PRI has
been continually under pressure to redistribute the benefits of industriali-
zation and to reject foreign domination--difficult tasks in a society where
aggregate saving is necessary in order to underwrite the costs of develop-
ment, and foreign capital and technology are necessary before moderni-
zation can proceed. After 1970, it became apparent that Mexico would
have difficulty resolving the conundrum of continued development. In
that year, Luis Echeverria, a PRI candidate who was widely perceived as
a champion of increased social spending, was elected President of the
Republic. Echeverria moved to distribute more land to the peasants of
Mexico, to increase social services for the poor, and to free Mexico from
its dependence on foreign capital and technology.8 4 Under the
Echeverria administration a legislative revolution occurred when the leg-
islature enacted laws restricting the trade and investment opportunities
for foreigners.8 5 The new statutes, which will be discussed below, codi-
fied administrative policies born during the decades of import
substitution.
The Echeverria administration did not seek to reject foreign assist-
79 See Twenty Questions, supra note 53, at 8.
80 H. Wright, sul~ra note 62, at 181-82.
81 See Comment, supra note 30, at 286-87.
82 Bus. Int'l Corp., supra note 50, at 12.
83 See R. Vernon, supra note 45, at 186.
84 For a critical view of Echeverria's economic policies, see Who's In Charge Here?, Econ-
omist, Dec. 4, 1976, at 14.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
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ance in developing the country but instead attempted to use foreign capi-
tal for nationalistic goals. However, by 1976 Mexico found itself in a
financial crisis. Scholars disagree as to whether the social spending of the
Echeverria government was a critical factor in bringing Mexico's
problems to a head or whether the worldwide recession following the oil
embargo of 1973 was more important. But the scholars agree that the
Mexican economy was in deep trouble: 6 a deficit of less than $1 billion
in 1972 had quadrupled by 1975,87 inflation had doubled within a year,
domestic purchasing had decreased, and unemployment had risen
drastically. 88
On August 31, 1976, the government devalued the peso by almost
100 percent and allowed it to float on the world market. Within a year
and a half the economy began to grow again and, spurred by the news
that major oil strikes had been made in southeastern Mexico, investment
increased. Mexican exports were boosted by the devaluation and began
to show a steady growth. 89
President L6pez Portillo, who took office in 1976, reversed the poli-
cies of the previous administration by slashing social spending, decreas-
ing state intervention in the economy, and courting foreign investment. 90
In March, 1979, the Chief Executive unveiled a Global Development
Plan for Mexico. The plan demonstrates Mexico's desire to work in con-
junction with foreigners in order to develop the nation.9' Part of the
program, the National Industrial Development Plan (NDIP), is intended
to make Mexico an exporter of industrial goods.92 Under the NDIP, the
Mexican government offers a supply of cheap energy and a variety of tax
subsidies to foreign businesses. In order to qualify for the subsidies, a
foreign business must increase employment in underdeveloped areas of
the country or produce goods for export abroad. 93 The NDIP also calls
for predetermined limits on oil production as a means of slowing infla-
tion and reserving domestic supplies. Although the administration has
already eased these production limits, it is clear that Mexico's develop-
ment model is to be Japan, not Saudi Arabia; therefore, oil sales will be
carefully paced, and industrialization will be funded with exports in ad-
dition to oil. 94
What does this program mean for U.S. business opportunities in
Mexico? The export trade is booming. Foodstuffs have been one of the
primary imports in the last five years. Although Mexico's land reform
placated the rural poor, it has left the country unable to feed itself. Since
86 See C. Tello, La Politica Econ6mica en Mxico 1970-76 (3d ed. 1979).
87 Street, supra note 16, at 375.
88 Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 17, at 204.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See Street, supra note 16, at 376-77.
92 Flanigan, Mexico's Drive to Industrialize: The Strategy, Forbes 42, 42 (Oct. 29, 1979).
93 See Street, supra note 16, at 376.
94 See id. at 377; Flanigan, supra note 92, at 42.
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the population is growing at an unparalleled rate, the country must now
import food to feed its citizens. During 1980 Mexico spent over $2 bil-
lion buying food in the United States.95
Overshadowing the demand for food imports will be the thirst for
heavy machinery and other capital goods (representing a $2.5 billion
market in 1978).96 Although agribusiness is taking over in some sections
of the country, the NDIP does not seek to modernize local agriculture
rapidly; instead it concentrates on industrial development. 97 Among the
products most in demand will be petroleum processing equipment and
petrochemical technology; turbines, boilers, and carburetors; printing
and graphics equipment; furniture manufacturing machinery; equip-
ment for the electric utility and communications industries; computer
technologies; and precision instruments.9"
Both the private sector and the government will be heavy purchas-
ers. While the government will rely on a domestic oligopoly of private
sector enterprises to build up many industries, 99 the NDIP also allocates
$27 billion for public sector investment (primarily in food processing and
oil production) during 1980-82.lo0
U.S. investors, as well as suppliers, will find fertile ground south of
the border. The policy of the L6pez Portillo administration has been to
increase the supply of capital available for developmental projects by
encouraging foreign investment. 0 1 This policy is likely to continue
under the new administration which will take office in December 1982.
The PRI candidate for president, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, has a
long career of service with the Bank of Mexico and has served as the
Secretary of Planning and Budget since 1979.102 In that position he was
one of the major architects of Mexico's ambitious Global Development
Plan. Thus, his election would seem to assure a continuity in govern-
ment economic policy over the next six years.' 0 3
The astute Mexican observer will recognize that the legal rules for
foreign entrepreneurs, suppliers, and investors require cooperation with
95 Street, supra note 16, at 375.
96 See Price Waterhouse & Co., Information Guide for Those Doing Business in Mexico 13
(Oct. 1979).
97 See Gonzi1ez Casanova, supra note 18, at 204.
98 Price Waterhouse & Co., supra note 96, at 11; Changes in Mexico Extend to Imports
Affecting U.S. Suppliers, Comm. Am. 25, 25 (Aug. 29, 1977); Mexico, A Major Market for U.S.
Products, Bus. Am. 3, 7 (June 16, 1980).
Firms located in North Carolina are already exporting to Mexico successfully. Among the
exports from the Tarheel State are textile machinery, tractors, buses, auto parts, switching
gears, grains, and precision measurement devices. Telephone interview with Gordon McRob-
erts, Director of International Marketing, International Division, North Carolina Department
of Commerce, Raleigh, N.C. (Nov. 11, 1980).
99 See Flanigan, supra note 92, at 42, 44.
100 Tower, Mexico: Third-Ranking U.S. Partner Shows Economic Strength, Bus. Am. 51,
51 (July 28, 1980).
1o See Flanigan, supra note 92, at 44.
102 Economic Growth, supra note 14, at 23.
103 Id.
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the Mexican authorities as they administer an economy in which public
and private enterprise are carefully controlled. Because of its increased
oil revenues, Mexico is now bargaining from a position of strength. The
legislation passed during the 1970's has become particularly important.
Foreign business interests must learn to operate within this new set of
legal constraints.
III. Legal Constraints on Foreigners doing Business in Mexico
Given the recent legislation in Mexico pertaining to foreign busi-
ness, one might think that the motto of the PRI administration has be-
come, "Seller, Entrepreneur, Investor-Beware!" Export firms, which
wish to sell products within the country find themselves confronting a
variety of new tariff barriers as well as the traditional importation permit
process. Foreign businesses which seek to license a technology in Mexico
or market a patent or trademark will encounter new legislation limiting
their ability to do so. Similarly, foreigners who invest in the country will
be immediately affected by the recent laws regarding foreign investment.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to embark upon profitable business ven-
tures in Mexico.
IV. Exporting to Mexico
Mexican officials view the control of importation as a key to the
efficient modernization of the country and, for that reason, the Mexican
government has steadfastly refused to make international treaty commit-
ments which would inhibit its ability to curb imports. 10 4  One of the
hottest debates in the L6pez Portillo administration was over Mexico's
position vis-ii-vis the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Those in favor of entry into GATT argued that failure to join the organi-
zation would subject Mexico to discriminatory treatment under the 1974
U.S. Trade Act' 0 5 (and similar legislation in other nations). Those op-
posed to entry feared increased economic competition and unemploy-
ment if tariffs were reduced to allow increased importation of foreign
goods. 10 6 On March 18, 1980, the President announced his decision;
Mexico would reject GATT. 10 7 Because recent commercial policy in
Mexico relied heavily on tariff barriers, the decision was not
104 Mexico entered into a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States in 1942 which
provided for no tariff increases and no quantitative controls on certain products, but this agree-
ment terminated in 1950. Mexico did, however, become a member of the Latin American Free
Trade Association in 1960. H. Wright, supra note 62, at 165-66.
105 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 19, 26, 31 U.S.C.). Section 404 of the Act, however, provides that the President may
by proclamation extend nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of a foreign country
which has entered into a bilateral commercial agreement with the U.S. Id. § 404. Thus, under
the Act, entry into GATT is not a prerequisite to favorable U.S. treatment.
106 See Mixed Feelings About Free Trade, Economist, Nov. 10, 1979, at 86-87.
107 See Mexico: Staying Sheltered, Economist, Mar. 22, 1980, at 70.
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unexpected. 108
Those exporting to Mexico should note that Mexico's tariff policy
has now been shaped to suit the needs of the country under its Global
Development Plan. In 1974, the Mexican government revamped its cus-
toms evaluation system and simplified the existing tariff schedule in or-
der to streamline the process for fixing customs duties. 10 9 Tariffs are
assigned on the fair market value of the goods when they reach the Mexi-
can border."10 The levies on imports where equivalent goods are already
produced in Mexico may run as high as seventy-five percent of the fair
market value of the goods as the government wants to encourage Mexi-
can purchasers to buy local products. Industrial raw materials and
heavy machinery may enter the country at substantially reduced tariff
levels because these products are considered necessary to the furtherance
of local industries. 111
Additionally, the foreign exporter may qualify for selective reduc-
tions of tariffs on specific goods. The Mexican government has lowered
import duties on the following classes of goods in order to stimulate eco-
nomic growth: a) machinery used to manufacture products for export,
b) machinery imported by small "Mexicanized" companies, c) imports
destined for the production of capital goods, and d) modern equipment
which may be used to make autos. 112 Subsidies are also available for
imports headed to the fishing industry, the in-bond assembly plants on
the border with the United States, and the cement industry."t 3 On the
other hand, goods being imported into Mexico are subject to an export
development surcharge, a customs improvement fee, and a value added
tax.1 4 Obviously, an exporter attempting to enter the Mexican market
should solicit the aid of a licensed customs broker.
Enterprises exporting to Mexico should also be aware of the require-
ments for import permits which originated during past decades of import
substitution. In order to import certain goods, Mexican purchasers must
apply for, and be granted, licenses from the Secretariat of Commerce. 15
Although approximately seventy percent of the 7500 tariff items do not
require licenses, the most important articles of trade do require them."16
In 1981, eighty-three percent of the total value of goods entering Mexico
were imported pursuant to a license granted by the Mexican govern-
ment. " 7 Import licenses are denied for items already made in Mexico or
108 But see id. for a contrary view.
109 Price Waterhouse & Co., supra note 96, at 49.
110 Twenty Questions, supra note 53, at 22.
III See id. at 12.
112 Id.
''3 Id.
114 Id. at 22-24.
'15 Id. at 24.
116 Id. at 25.
117 Economic Growth, supra note 14, at 23.
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for consumer goods that do not benefit national development."18 The
government also has established quotas for some classes of goods, such as
computers, in order to restrain indiscriminate spending abroad.' 9 Fur-
thermore, the government sometimes allocates import quotas to those
firms who promise to establish manufacturing facilities in Mexico.12
0
Foreign sellers should be aware of marketing practices within Mex-
ico. Most foreign products are sold through nation-wide distributors lo-
cated in Mexico City. These distributors normally will seek an exclusive
right to market the product within the country.' 2' The seller's initial
commitment to the distributor should be carefully limited as to time, so
that the seller may terminate the relationship without incurring penalties
under Mexico's labor laws. 122 Many Mexican firms, especially those
buying big ticket items, prefer to deal directly with the foreign seller;
however, local contacts in Mexico are often crucial to sales.' 23 If the
foreign supplier hires an agent within the country, that agent becomes an
employee of the foreigner, and the foreign supplier, as an employer, is
subject to the labor laws of Mexico.' 24 Any distributors or agents selling
to a state agency or government-owned corporation must register with
the Secretariat of Commerce and with the purchasing department of the
state organization involved. Registration is not required for sales to the
private sector.' 25
Foreign firms exporting to Mexico must consider marketing prac-
tices, customs duties, and the import licensing process. In each of these
areas the Mexican government has intervened in the sales process in or-
der to guard Mexico's foreign exchange reserve and insure that it is spent
in a manner beneficial to the nation.
V. Licensing Agreements
A foreign enterprise that wishes to license or sell technology, patents,
trademarks, or designs in Mexico must recognize that it is trading with
the Mexican government as well as a Mexican commercial partner. Dur-
ing the 1960's, U.S. trade brochures recommended licensing as a pre-
ferred form of doing business in Mexico because there were no
restrictions on a foreigner's ability to enter the licensing contract.
26
Mexican authorities have re-examined this open-door attitude toward li-
censing agreements. An increasing disenchantment with import substi-
118 Id.
'19 Id.
120 Id.
121 Twenty Questions, supra note 53, at 7.
122 See Ley Federal de Trabajo (Federal Labor Law), arts. 162, 285, 287, 289, D.O. (Apr. 1,
1970) [hereinafter cited as Federal Labor Law]; see also S. Methodist Univ., Doing Business in
Mexico §25.02 (1980).
123 See Twenty Questions, supra note 53, at 7.
124 Federal Labor Law, supra note 122, art. 285.
125 Twenty Questions, supra note 53, at 8-9.
126 Bus. Int'l Corp., supra note 50, at 27.
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tution as a means of developing heavy industry has forced authorities to
analyze the costs and benefits of acquiring foreign technology with no
strings attached. Miguel Wionczek, a prominent Mexican economist,
did a study for the United Nations which concluded that Mexico and
other developing countries were paying too much for the industrial prop-
erty rights they received, were acquiring obsolete technologies, and were
merely perpetuating the underdevelopment of their own economies.' 2
7
Other critics of third world "dependency," like Gerardo Bueno, reached
similar conclusions, 28 as did a further study by the United Nations
Committee on Trade and Development. 1
29
In 1972, the Mexican Congress reacted to these studies by passing a
Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks (Technology Transfer Law). 130
C~sar Sepulveda, former Commission of Patents in Mexico and professor
of Industrial Property Law at the National University, explained the mo-
tivation behind the measure:
Through this Law, the Government intends to achieve the following
objectives: to ensure that no major or unjustified remittances substan-
tially affecting the balance of payments are made to foreign countries in
the form of royalties; to ascertain the real content of the technology
transferred from abroad to Mexico and to determine whether alternative
technology can be obtained which would be more recent and sophisti-
cated and cheaper or more in accord with needs of the country's eco-
nomic and social development; to prevent a rise in the price of many
products as a result of the employment of famous foreign trademarks, for
the use of which large amounts are paid without any introduction of
technology; and lastly, to draw up an inventory or catalog of existing
technology for consultation and evaluation.
An additional, indirect objective is to ascertain the role of technol-
ogy in the field of foreign investment in Mexico--by determining the
proportion of foreign capital in the enterprises receiving technology. A
further collateral objective is to prevent fraud on the internal revenue
authorities-to ensure that income declared as royalties by a supplier of
technology does not in fact come under different fiscal categories subject
to higher tax or another type of control.131
To accomplish these purposes, the statute established a National
Registry of Transfer of Technology within the Ministry of Patrimony
and Industrial Development wherein all acts, agreements, or contracts
127 M. Wionczek, Arrangements for the Transfer of Operative Technology to Developing
Countries--Case Study of Mexico, 44 U.N. ESCOR Annex 3 (Agenda Item 6), U.N. Doc.
E/4452/Add.3 (1968).
128 See Bueno, supra note 75.
129 Transfer of Technology: Policies Relating to Technology of the Countries of the An-
dean Pact, 3 U.N. UNCTAD (Agenda Item 19), U.N. Doc. TD/107 (1971). See also The Role
of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, 37 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda
Item 13), U.N. Doc. E/3861/Rev.I (1964); Camp & Mann, Regulating the Transfer of Technol-
ogy: The Mexican Experience, Col. J. World Bus., Summer 1975, at 110, 119.
130 Technology Transfer Law, supra note 2.
131 Sepsilveda, Mexican Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology, 13 Indust.
Prop. 32, 32 (1974).
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regarding the use of patents, trademarks, industrial models, inventions,
technical know-how, or business and administrative services must be reg-
istered within 60 days of their execution.' 3 2 Failure to register such con-
tracts renders them unenforceable.133 The duty to register the contract
falls upon parties or beneficiaries who are Mexican individuals or corpo-
rations, foreigners or foreign entities established in Mexico, and branches
or agencies of foreign entities established in Mexico.134
The heart of the Technology Transfer Law lies in Article 7, which
empowers the Ministry to deny registration and thereby render null and
void any agreement which contains certain prohibited clauses.' 3 5 Abso-
lutely prohibited are contracts which: a) attempt to transfer a technol-
ogy already freely available in Mexico; b) require the licensee to "grant-
back" to the licensor any improvements in the technology; c) limit the
recipient's research and development; d) prohibit the exportation of
goods or services produced by the licensee in a manner contrary to the
national interest; e) extend the term of the licensing agreement for an
excessively long period-with ten years as an ultimate limit; or f) make
interpretation or performance of the contract subject to decision by a
foreign court.'3 6 The Ministry will also deny registration if the royalties
are excessive, if the foreigner attempts to intervene in the management of
a local enterprise, or if the agreement contains "tying features," which
are defined as requirements that the licensee must deal exclusively with a
single source for the purchase of equipment and raw materials or for the
sale of items manufactured with the technology.' 3 7 Furthermore, the
Ministry will refuse registration if the contract contains production limi-
tations, sets minimum prices for the sale of the goods produced, or com-
pels the licensee to use foreign personnel. 38
After examining the literal provisions of the Technology Transfer
Law, a foreign firm might consider licensing in Mexico to be unattrac-
tive. However, the administration of any statute is critical to its effects
on the business community, and this is especially true in Mexico where
the executive authorities have extraordinary powers.' 3 9 A study of the
132 Technology Transfer Law, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2, 4.
133 Id. art. 6.
134 Id. art. 3.
135 Id. art. 7.
136 Id. Such prohibited clauses were common in Mexican licensing agreements before the
Technology Transfer Law became effective. One survey in 1969 showed that 97% of the con-
tracts surveyed had restrictions on exports by the licensee. Barrett, The Role of Patents in the
Sale of Technology in Mexico, 22 Am. J. Comp. L. 230, 260-61 (1974).
By eliminating excessive royalty payments, officials of the Secretary of Industry and Com-
merce of Mexico estimated savings to Mexican licensees of $350 million from 1973 to 1976.
Perez Vargas, Major Innovations Regarding Trade and Service Marks in the Newly Revised
Mexican Law on Inventions and Marks-A Mexican Perspective, 66 Trademark Rep. 188, 192
(1976).
137 Technology Transfer Law, supra note 2, art. 7.
138 Id.
139 See Camp & Mann, supra note 129, at 117.
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records in the Registry for the first two years of the Law's existence re-
vealed that the most common reasons for contract nullification were:
a) unjustified contract prices, royalty remittance, and tying features,
b) unreasonable length of contractual obligation or output restrictions,
and c) restrictions on exportation or research and development, includ-
ing grant-back clauses. 140
Moreover, in December 1974, the Ministry itself distributed an un-
published "Summary of the General Criteria for the Application of the
Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use of
Patents and Trademarks." This Summary contained an extensive discus-
sion of the Ministry's criteria for determining the appropriate compensa-
tion for a license.' 4 ' The Ministry will first analyze the total flow of
payments under the agreement, adding to the initial contract price an
estimate of the royalties which will be due, plus any other remittances. 42
This figure will then be compared to total flow figures from comparable
contracts in both Mexico and abroad.' 43 The Summary notes that a
distinction will be drawn between the various types of licensing agree-
ments.- No royalty will be allowed if the licensee is a majority-owned
subsidiary of the licensor,' 44 whereas royalties of approximately one pre-
cent of net sales will be permitted if the licensor has no equity ownership
in the license.' 45 Technical assistance agreements must be limited in
duration and cannot exceed the period necessary for the licensee to ab-
sorb the technology. 46 Finally, higher remittance rates may be permissi-
ble if the technology is one of particular importance to the nation. 14 7
The Summary also addressed other provisions of the Technology
Transfer Law and, in many cases, mitigated its harsh provisions. For
example, contracts prohibiting export sales will be registered if the licen-
sor is precluded from granting export rights by the laws of its own domi-
cile, or if the licensor has previously granted exclusive marketing rights
under another licensing agreement, or if the export limitations will not
prevent the Mexican licensee from entering markets that are adequate to
satisfy the licensee's export capacity, e.g., the American continents.1 48
Licensing agreements may also be approved, despite tying provisions,
where the licensor is the only entity capable of providing or purchasing
140 Id. at 111.
141 The "Summary" is cited and discussed extensively in Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte,
Mexico's New Transfer of Technology and Foreign Investment Laws-To What Extent Have
the Rules Changed?, 10 Int'l Law. 231, 235-38 (1976).
142 Id. at 235-36.
143 Id. at 236.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id., stating that certain industries such as chemicals, electronics, pharmaceuticals
and telecommunication have been allowed higher percentage rates than the usual fee of 3% or
less of net sales.
148 Id. at 237.
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the "tied in" materials or services. 149 Mandatory temporary employ-
ment of foreign personnel by the licensee is acceptable as a provision if
the licensor agrees to train Mexicans to ultimately fill the positions. 150
While forum stipulation clauses or choice of law clauses which specify a
non-Mexican forum are fatal to the agreement, a failure to specify the
applicable law or forum will not be. Clauses stipulating arbitration are
allowed. 151
Foreign firms contemplating licensing agreements must consider
whether or not the payoff from the contract will justify the possibility
that trade secrets will be lost in the process, and must measure their own
research and development expenses as a part of the price for their tech-
nology. 152 This is particularly important because the Summary de-
mands an outright sale of technologies which have not been patented.153
One provision in the Summary, requiring unpatented technologies
to be sold to a licensee, was later enacted into law in another piece of
nationalistic Mexican legislation, the 1976 Law of Inventions and Trade-
marks. ' 54 Since the passage of this act, some foreign critics have charged
that Mexico intends to confiscate trade secrets and expropriate the good-
will associated with well-known foreign products. 155 On the other hand,
the politicians who passed the measure see it as a legitimate means of
facilitating the creation of Mexican trademarks and promoting their ac-
ceptance in both the domestic and international markets. The politi-
cians further argue that the act will stimulate the development of new
inventions within Mexico. 156
Undoubtedly the Law on Inventions and Trademarks shatters the
traditional protection extended to inventors and entrepreneurs under
U.S. legislation on industrial property rights. 157 The law contains the
following innovations: a) it obliges a patent holder to exploit his patent
within three years after its registration or else face the revocation or the
obligatory licensing of the patent; 158 b) it enumerates an entire realm of
nonpatentable inventions-including vegetable varieties, alloys, chemi-
cal products, pharmaceutical products, devices relating to nuclear energy
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 237-38.
152 A business contemplating a licensing agreement in Mexico should submit the proposed
contract to the Registry to see if it meets with the approval of the administrators. Such a
procedure is commonly used. Camp & Mann, supra note 129, at 118-19.
153 Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, supra note 141, at 251.
154 Trademark Law, supra note 13.
155 See, e.g., Lanahan, Trademarks in Mexico-A United States Perspective, 66 Trade-
mark Rep. 205, 219-20 (1976).
156 See Perez Vargas, supra note 136, at 199; James, Linking Foreign with Mexican Trade-
marks: Boon or Bane? 8 Ca. West. Int'l L.J. 43, 49 (1978).
'57 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976) (Trade-Marks); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) (Patents).
158 Trademark Law, supra note 13, art. 41.
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or defense, and anti-pollution equipment; 159 c) it creates a new category
for the protection of industrial property, the Certificate of Invention,
which allows the holder to license his non-patentable invention, but obli-
gates him to provide interested third parties with enough information to
use the invention; 16° d) it limits trademark protection to a five year pe-
riod and trademark renewals to five years at a time; 161 e) it provides for
the compulsory licensing of trademarks 6 2 and the forfeiture of unused
marks; 163 f) it extends the list of names and designs which cannot be used
as trademarks. 164 Although these are innovative measures, the most con-
troversial feature of the Trademark Law is Article 127 which provides
that a trademark registered in a foreign nation may not be used in Mex-
ico unless it is linked with a Mexican trademark of equal visibility.'
65
Under regulations issued to clarify this article, the owner has one year
following the registration of a trademark licensing agreement to link his
foreign mark with a Mexican trademark.1
66
Once again, the manner in which this Trademark Law is adminis-
tered will determine its effect on foreign business interests. Because of
the controversy surrounding Article 127, the Ministry of Patrimony sus-
pended its effective date until December 29, 1981, and has also decided
to allow trademark holders to apply for further postponements on a case
by case basis.
A foreigner contemplating a potential licensing agreement in Mex-
ico must be aware of the manner in which the Mexican authorities have
restricted the transfer of technology and the use of patents and trade-
marks. Although the laws in these areas are explicitly intended to con-
trol foreign influence in Mexican markets, the Mexican government has
developed a pragmatic attitude toward their execution in order to attract
technologies necessary for economic development.
VI. Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico
For those foreign firms that wish to benefit from the future expan-
sion of the Mexican economy, direct investment in the country affords
another type of business opportunity. However, in this area too, Mexico
has limited the options for foreigners. In 1973, the Mexican Congress
enacted the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Foreign Invest-
ment.167 Perhaps more than any of the other laws previously discussed,
this Investment Law bears the marks of Mexico's revolutionary past.
159 Id. art. 10.
160 Id. arts. 65-80.
161 Id. art. 112.
162 Id. art. 132.
163 Id. art. 117.
164 Id. art. 147; see also id. art. 91.
165 Id. art. 127.
166 See Reglamento de [a Ley de Invenciones y Marcas (Regulations for the Law of Inven-
tions and Trademarks), D.O. (Feb. 20, 1981).
167 Investment Law, supra note 1.
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With its passage, the banner of economic independence was raised once
again, as it had been during the 1938 oil expropriation. 168 The Invest-
ment Law is intended to promote the "Mexicanization" of industry and
to force foreign capital into a role which complements the actions of pri-
vate Mexican investors. 169 Under the Investment Law, foreigners, for-
eign corporations, and domestic corporations with a majority of foreign
capital must agree to be treated as Mexican nationals before they can
own any property in the nation.' 70 Although this provision is a replica-
tion of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution' 7' its enactment in statu-
tory form demonstrates the legislature's intent to "Mexicanize" foreign
investment.
Other sections of the Investment Law are equally nationalistic. The
law reserves participation in certain economic activities, such as petro-
leum production, the generation of electricity, and the railroads to the
Mexican government. 7 2 Other activities, including radio and television,
transportation, and forestry are reserved for corporations wholly-owned
by Mexican citizens.' 7 3 Yet the most significant feature of the invest-
ment law is Article 8, which states that, without authorization of the
Mexican government, the maximum foreign investment in the capital of
any enterprise may not exceed twenty-five percent of the total capital or
over forty-nine percent of the fixed assets, and that a foreign investor
may not have, by any means, the ability to control the management of
the enterprise. 74 The government has administered this law by declar-
ing that all acquisitions of stock and all incorporations involving foreign-
ers must be registered in the National Commission on Foreign
Investment to make investment decisions in the national interest. 75 For-
eign businesses which were majority-owned by foreigners before the pas-
sage of the law may continue to operate in Mexico; however, if such
businesses intend to expand a product line, then theoretically they must
"Mexicanize." 176
As with the Technology Transfer Law, the strict provisions of the
Investment Law have been relaxed in a series of administrative rulings
by the Commission. For example, border assembly industries may rou-
tinely operate with one hundred percent foreign capital. 77 Further-
more, the administrators have taken a pragmatic approach in individual
168 See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
169 Gomez-Palacio, Defining "New Lines of Products" Under Mexico's Foreign Investment
Law, 8 Ca. West. Int'l LJ. 74, 79-80 (1978).
170 Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
171 Constitution, supra note 37, art. 27, § I (amended 1960). See also Rangel Medina,
Significant Innovations of the New Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks, 7 Ga. J. Int'l
Comp. L. 5, 16 (1977); Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, supra note 141, at 238.
172 Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
173 Id.
174 Id. art. 8.
175 Id. art. II.
176 See Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, supra note 141, at 249.
'77 Id. at 246.
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cases, as evidenced by a 1976 agreement which allows IBM to manufac-
ture typewriters at a wholly owned subsidiary in Guadalajara. 178 Analy-
sis of the decisions made by the Commission between 1973 and 1976
found that seventy-six percent of rulings were favorable to foreign inves-
tors, 179 despite the fact that this was the most "radical" period of the
Echeverria administration. Significantly, the Commission has inter-
preted Article 8 of the Investment Law as requiring its authorization for
any increase whatsoever in foreign ownership beyond twenty-five percent
of the stock or forty-nine percent of the fixed assets of the Mexican
company. 180
For those foreigners who are willing to work within the confines of
the Investment Law, the rewards may be substantial. Mexicans have
especially favored joint ventures in recent years.18 Existing foreign
owned industries can "Mexicanize" within three to four weeks by filing
the proper documents with the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign
Investment Registry and the Secretariat of Commerce.' 82 This Mexi-
canization allows a corporation a variety of benefits under the National
Industrial Development Plan:183 a reduction in energy prices for decen-
tralized enterprises, 184 tax credits for undertakings in high priority fields
such as petrochemicals and construction. 185 The Commission has not
developed rigid guidelines to determine whether a company is "Mexi-
canized." Critical factors include the percentage of equity held by out-
siders, the use of Mexican source materials in the business, the number of
Mexican workers employed and the amount they are paid, and the com-
pany's record of compliance with the 1972 Technology Transfer Law
and the 1976 Law on Trademarks. 186
Thus, although the Mexican authorities have shown a renewed in-
terest in using the nationalistic legislation of the Echeverria years to limit
the role of foreigners who would attempt to control their economy, they
have also demonstrated a flexible attitude toward the administration of
the laws.
VII. Conclusion
A lawyer attempting to represent a company doing business in Mex-
ico should be aware of the public policy which has shaped Mexican trade
legislation and should understand the manner in which that legislation is
administered. Mexico has not rejected the capitalist model of develop-
178 Id. at 249 n.73.
179 Id. at 248.
180 Id. at 250.
181 See Twenty Questions, supra note 53, at 2, 7.
182 Id. at 17.
183 Id. at 13-14.
184 Id. at 13.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 14.
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ment, but neither has it abandoned its ideological commitment to social
change. In part, the Mexican Revolution was a reaction to foreign domi-
nation of the local economy. As a consequence of its historical experi-
ence, the Mexican government has attempted to create a nation which
will be free of foreign control. Mexican trade legislation is indicative of
this public policy. The predominant party in Mexico has always been
revolutionary in name, and a hallmark of its creed has been economic
independence. The Government has chosen different means of pursuing
this goal: the expropriation of oil wells, 18 7 the drive for import substitu-
tion through tariff barriers and import licensing,'8 8 the prohibition of
direct investment in selected industries, 189 the "Mexicanization" of local
companies, 190 the restriction of technology transfers,' 9 1 and the modifica-
tion of patent and trademark protection. 92 Mexican law thus reflects
the government's revolutionary intent and its desire to alter the nation's
dependent relationship with the developed world.
Those who represent foreign businesses in Mexico will find that the
PRI government has a pragmatic attitude toward the administration of
the law. The Mexican authorities recognize that they must have access
to foreign technology in order to build their own industrial base and that
they must be able to export Mexican products in order to finance domes-
tic enterprises. Moreover, they welcome foreign investors who will work
in conjunction with the private sector in Mexico.
Critics of the Mexican legal system have attacked the country's leg-
islative revolution for various, often contradictory, reasons. Counsel for
multinational corporations have argued that Mexico is now making irra-
tional demands of foreign companies and that, in the long run, the coun-
try will suffer. 193 According to this line of argument, Mexican laws on
the transfer of technology and foreign investment will damage the future
of the nation because they will compel foreign businesses to reject oppor-
tunities in the Mexican marketplace. Since the country must have new
technologies and new capital inputs in order to advance, these xenopho-
bic statutes can only harm the Mexican people.
On the other hand, Mexican social scientists, like Pablo Gonz~les
Casanova, have asserted that precisely the opposite is true.' 94 While the
legislation appears to impose controls on foreign business, Gonziles Cas-
anova argues it has failed miserably. The Mexican state, according to his
analysis, is unable to achieve its social objectives within an economy con-
187 See supra text accompanying note 51.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 62-66, 115-20.
189 See supra text accompanying note 172.
190 See supra text accompanying note 176.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 130 & 131.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 157-66.
193 But see Lacey, supra note 4, at 406, for a generally favorable evaluation of Mexico's
transfer of technology laws, when compared to legislation in other Latin American countries.
194 See Gonzilez Casanova, supra note 18.
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trolled by "foreign and Mexican monopolistic capital."' 95 As a result,
the Mexican government talks about assuring the economic indepen-
dence of the nation, but it continually fails in its efforts to alter the fun-
damental inequities in the society.
The leaders of Mexico are naturally caught in the center of this de-
bate. This review of Mexican trade legislation demonstrates the tension
which has long existed in official policy, a tension between the need to
modernize the nation by using foreign capital and the desire to assert
complete autonomy from foreign control.
As Mexico enters the 1980's, the government has gained new lever-
age in its struggle to comply with the heritage of the Revolution. The
Mexican authorities have been concerned with foreign domination since
the days of the independence movements in the nineteenth century, and
they have been especially concerned with the overwhelming influence of
the United States. Now that Mexico has obtained new economic power
as an oil exporter, one would expect that the government will demand to
be treated with new respect. The past President of Mexico, Jos6 L6pez
Portillo, made just that point in an interview with a U.S. newspaperman
when he asserted, "We do not want to deal unjustly with the United
States; we just want the United States to deal justly with us.' 1 96 What
remains to be seen is whether or not the legislative revolution against
foreign domination will enable the Mexican authorities to achieve an
economic independence that benefits the Mexican people.
-- Stewart W. Fisher
[Editor's Note: As this article goes to press, the L6pez Portillo adminis-
tration has nationalized domestic banks and renewed controls on the ex-
change rate for pesos. Negotiations are underway to renegotiate
Mexico's international debts, and the economic picture for Mexico ap-
pears gloomy in the short-run. Nevertheless, the recent actions by the
Mexican government are yet another indication of that government's
commitment to controlling Mexican development from within.]
195 Id. at 200.
196 Quoted in Lanahan, supra note 155, at 207.

